High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac

Reclaiming Their Honor

Book

Explore the Unsung Valor of the Late-War Union Volunteers During the Civil War


Dive into the untold story of the late-war Union Volunteers with High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac: Reclaiming Their Honor, a groundbreaking book by Edwin P. Rutan II that challenges long-held views and sheds light on the pivotal yet overlooked contributions of high-bounty soldiers. This meticulously researched work not only redefines our understanding of these men’s roles but also celebrates their vital impact on the Union’s victory.

Book Description

In High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac: Reclaiming Their Honor, author Edwin P. Rutan II challenges conventional narratives and illuminates the crucial contributions of the late-war recruits, often overlooked in Civil War histories. These men, recruited under high-bounty incentives during the later stages of the war, have historically been dismissed as lesser soldiers compared to their earlier-enlisting counterparts. Rutan’s compelling narrative seeks to correct this misrepresentation by examining their true impact on the Union’s success.


Drawing upon a wealth of historical data, including personal letters, army personnel records, and casualty reports, Rutan analyzes the combat effectiveness of these soldiers through a new lens. The book critically assesses accusations of poor performance in battle and high desertion rates, providing a nuanced view that highlights the bravery and significant sacrifices these men made. Rutan argues that these late-war volunteers were as dedicated and capable as those who enlisted earlier, effectively dispelling myths of their inferiority.


High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac not only offers a reevaluation of the soldiers' military effectiveness but also explores the socio-political contexts that led to their differing public perceptions. It delves into how these perceptions have shaped our understanding of Civil War history and how, by revisiting these overlooked narratives, we can gain a fuller appreciation of the complexities of historical memory.


This book is an essential read for anyone interested in the Civil War, military history, and the power of historical narrative. It is a tribute to the unsung heroes whose stories deserve recognition and honor in the annals of American history.

Key Features:

Data-Driven Analysis

Chart 6.1 from High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac About Battle Deaths: Pennsylvania Soldiers in the Army of the Potomac.

The key conclusions in High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac are supported by extensive data from two new databases created for this project and contemporary Civil War records. The data are summarized in over thirty tables. Additional tables are provided on the latewarunionsoldiers.org website which supports the book.


For example, the claim that the "high-bounty" men shirked combat is addressed by comparing the casualty data for the Pennsylvania men joining the Army of the Potomac later in the war with the casualty data for the Pennsylvania men joining the AOP in 1861 and 1862. The data suggests that late-war Pennsylvania volunteers died in combat with the same frequency as the veterans from 1861 and 1862 when the shorter time spent in the field of late-war volunteers was factored in.

Detailed Maps

Battle of Five Forks Civil War Map by Hel Jesperswen from High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac.

Every reader of military history knows the importance of excellent maps supporting the text. The maps designed by Hal Jespersen for High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac meet that test.

New Perspectives on Combat Effectiveness

Regimental Effectiveness Diagram from High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac

The combat effectiveness analytic framework has been utilized to assess the performance of armies in European wars, from the campaigns of the Army of Revolutionary France to World War II, but High Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac is the first book about the Civil War to make extensive use of combat effectiveness. High Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac uses combat effectiveness to explain how late-war Union soldiers were often able to perform like veterans in their first battle.


The models developed by prior historians have focused on the combat effectiveness of armies. High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac has developed a less complex model to assess the performance of regiments and other smaller units.


Combat effectiveness is used to explain how eight "high-number" regiments were able to "perform like veterans" in their first battle--the 185th New York and the 198th Pennsylvania in Chamberlain's Brigade in the Five Forks Campaign and the 200th, 205th, 207th, 208th, 209th and 211th Pennsylvania in Hartranft's Division at Fort Stedman.

New Perspective on Economic Motivation


Historians have long praised the volunteers of 1861 and 1862 as patriots while branding the "high-bounty" men as mercenaries. William Marvel provided a much-needed analysis of the economic motivation for volunteering in the Union Army early in the war in Lincoln's Mercenaries (2018) to question the primacy of patriotism as a motivation. Marvel's analysis of economic motivation was based on wealth data from the 1860 Census. High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac complements Marvel's analysis by using income data--comparing civilian wages for selected occupations with potential military compensation (the largest component of which was the federal, state, and local bounties). High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac concludes that volunteering could have been viewed as "economically compelling" by a quarter and perhaps as many as half of the men in the Eastern States during the summer of 1862.

New Perspective and Data on Desertion


The causes of desertion in the Union army—including the high bounties—have received limited attention from historians since Ella Lonn's Desertion During the Civil War (1928). Historians' claim that the "high-bounty" men frequently deserted has been supported by anecdotes rather than data. High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac considers causes of desertion not addressed by Lonn, notably the failure of unit cohesion and provides data.

Educational Value:


High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac illustrates how a wide range of data--including wage data, election data, demographic data, and casualty data--can be used to support conclusions

Socio-Political Context:


Criticism of the "high bounties" prevailing later in the war has rarely gone deeper to examine the critical role that the higher bounties played in raising the Union army later in the war after patriotism waned as a motivation to enlist. High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac provides that necessary deeper look. In particular, High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac explains how local governments used higher bounties to mitigate the impact of the draft on their local economy and more established citizens.

Civil War Historiography:


Even before the Civil War was over, the Union veterans from 1861 and 1862 began criticizing the "high-bounty" men in the most demeaning terms, and Civil War historians have followed that criticism without adequate review ever since. High-Bounty Men contributes to Civil War historiography by questioning long-standing biases and presenting a more balanced description of the service of the late-war Union soldiers

Compelling Narratives:


Engaging stories and personal anecdotes from soldiers bring the statistics and historical analysis to life, providing a humanizing perspective on the "high-bounty" men.

Transparent Methodology:


In addition to discussing methodology in the book itself, the latewarunionsoldirers.org website provides an extensive discussion of the methodology employed on numerous points.

Author Commentary

Headshot of Edwin P. Rutan II, author of High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac

I thoroughly enjoyed researching and writing High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac: Reclaiming Their Honor. Here is how I approached the project. During my research for If I Have Got to Go and Fight, I Am Willing A Union Regiment Forged in the Petersburg Campaign. The 179th New York Volunteer Infantry 1864-1865--a regimental history of a "high-number" regiment, I encountered the criticism by James McPherson and other historians that the "high-bounty" men recruited later in the war were mercenaries who made poor soldiers and contributed little to the Union victory. The performance of the 179th New York, notably in its first battle when it suffered forty percent casualties in taking entrenched Confederate positions, made me question the validity of that criticism.

That led to the current project with the working title of High-Bounty Men and High-Number Regiments: A Reappraisal. I started out with two components to the reappraisal. First, it seemed to me that the bounties in 1862 may have been high enough to be economically attractive--that the volunteers of 1862 were not necessarily purely motivated by patriotism as historians have traditionally claimed. Second, the actual performance of the "high-bounty" men and "high-number" regiments in battle needed to be examined to test the poor soldier accusation.


I decided that the best way to pursue the first component was to look at how much money men in various civilian occupations made in 1862 and compare that to how much money they would make if they volunteered. Bounties were the largest component of military compensation. The federal bounty was a constant, but the state--and especially the local bounties--varied significantly. I set out to research local bounties, in the end documenting the bounties for over one thousand communities in the Eastern States. I concluded that volunteering could have been "economically compelling" in 1862 for men in lower-paying occupations like laborer.


In 2018, Earl Hess put me in touch with William Marvel, who was then about to publish Lincoln's Mercenaries. My "income-based" approach complements his "wealth-based" approach to economic motivation and we both agreed that Civil War historians traditionally gave too little attention to the economic aspect of motivation in the early years of the war.


My "income-based" model definitely indicated that the vast majority of "high-bounty" men could have been motivated by the money to enlist, but that does not ipso facto mean that they made poor soldiers. I began looking for examples beyond the 179th New York of how "high-bounty" men and "high-number" regiments actually performed in battle. Early on, I encountered the six "high-number" regiments in Hartranft's Division of the Ninth Corps, who were widely praised for "performing like veterans" in their first battle when they shut down the Confederate breakthrough at Fort Stedman. The "high-number" 185th New York and 198th Pennsylvania, which comprised Chamberlain's Brigade in the Fifth Corps, received similar praise during the Five Forks Campaign.


A natural question arose. How was it that the "high-bounty" men were able to perform like veterans in their first battle. In order to answer that question, I initially drew on my army training as an intelligence analyst, which taught me how to identify and analyze the capabilities of military units. I combined my military training with the combat effectiveness methodology of historians like John Lynn (The Bayonets of the Republic) and the readiness methodology used by the Department of Defense to create the Regimental Effectiveness methodology that I followed for High-Bounty Men in the Army of the Potomac. The heart of the book is Chapter Six, which explains the methodology, and Ten and Eleven, which apply it to the "high-number" regiments in Hartranft's Division and Chamberlain's Brigade, respectively.


The late Richard J. Sommers' claim in Richmond Redeemed that the "high-bounty" men had "wrecked" the Second Corps at the Battle of Second Reams's Station was one of the most damning accusations against the "high-bounty" men that I had encountered. There is no dispute that the Second Corps was badly defeated at Second Ream's Station, but my research-- which included a detailed analysis of the composition of the regiments engaged--showed that the veterans from 1861 and 1862 were subject to just as much criticism as the "high-bounty" recruits. Mistakes by the Union commanders, including General Hancock himself, also contributed to the Union defeat. (See Chapter Nine)


I certainly do not claim that the "high-bounty" men made perfect soldiers or that they were better soldiers than the veterans of 1861 and 1862, but as a group, the "high-bounty" men in the Army of the Potomac definitely were not "poor" soldiers as historians have claimed for far too long. The "high-bounty" men in the Army of the Potomac made good soldiers and they are entitled to share in the glory of the Union victory.

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